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Fertility decline in developing countries may have unexpected demographic consequences.
Although lower fertility improves nutrition, health, and human capital investments for surviv-
ing children, little is known about the relationship between fertility outcomes and female-male
ospring sex-ratios. Particularly in countries with a cultural preference for sons, like India and
China, fertility decline may deteriorate the already imbalanced sex-ratios. We use the fertility
histories of over 90,000 Indian women in the Second National Family and Health Survey to
investigate the relationship between fertility choices and ospring sex-ratios in India. Both
within- and between-family-size dierences in ospring sex-ratios are examined. Our analysis
reveals three main ndings. First, within-family-size dierences show that for our reference
household (i.e. non-low-caste Hindus), parental education reduces anti-female bias in survival
in large families (three or more children households) but plays no role in small families (one
or two children households). While a higher standard of living worsens anti-female bias in
survival in both large and small families, it does so to a greater extent in small families. Small
families that own land also have lower ospring sex-ratios compared to landless households.
Second, between-family-size dierences indicate an `intensication' eect, whereby small fam-
ilies have dramatically lower ospring sex-ratios than large families. The intensication eect
is greatest for Sikh and non-low-caste Hindu households, followed by low-caste Hindu and
Christian households, but does not exist for Muslims. Third, while maternal education and
urban residence weaken the intensication eect, paternal education, a higher standard of liv-
ing, and land ownership strengthen it. Our results suggest that fertility decline, together with
economic growth, may worsen India's already imbalanced sex-ratios. Thus, much needed fer-
tility control policies must be supplemented with programs that counter ospring sex-selection
in favor of sons. Policies that seek to eradicate son preference by making daughters more eco-
nomically attractive to parents as well as those that imbibe more gender-equal attitudes within
individuals are critically needed as economic growth generates higher levels of education and
wealth in India.
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11 Introduction
During the past half century, India has experienced two striking demographic features. First,
fertility has declined rapidly, as evidenced by the total fertility rate falling from 6.0 in 1951 to
2.7 in 2005, as shown in Figure 1.1 Second, as Figure 2 shows, female disadvantage in survival
among children has worsened. Despite a signicant increase in the availability of health care and
improved nutrition, the relative number of girls under ve has fallen dramatically, from 1010 in
1941 to 927 girls per 1000 boys in 2001. The stark inter-regional heterogeneity of sex-ratios at
birth is particularly striking in this respect, with state-level rates varying from 0.78 and 0.79 in
Haryana and Punjab to 1.00 and 0.99 in Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram, respectively.2 The
map in gure 3 illustrates this geographic pattern and clearly shows a concentration of the missing
women phenomenon in the Northwest part of the country.
In this paper, we explore the relationship between fertility choices and ospring sex-ratios in
India using fertility histories of over 90,000 women aged 15-49 years. Both within- and between-
family-size dierences in ospring sex-ratios are examined by focusing on small and large families.
We dene small families as those with one or two children whereas large families are those with
three or more children. We nd three interesting results. First, focusing on the reference household
{ i.e. Hindu households who are not members of a scheduled caste, scheduled tribe, or other
backward caste { within-family-size dierences show that parental education reduces anti-female
bias in survival in large families but not in small families. While a higher standard of living worsens
anti-female bias in survival in both large and small families, it does so to a greater extent in small
families. Small families that own land also have lower ospring sex-ratios compared to landless
households. Second, between-family-size dierences indicate an `intensication' eect, whereby
small families have dramatically lower ospring sex-ratios than large families. The intensication
eect is greatest for Sikh and non-low-caste Hindu households, followed by Christian and low-caste
1The total fertility rate measures the number of children a woman would have during her reproductive years if
in each ve-year age interval from ages 15-49 she had the number of children that women of that age currently have
in the population as a whole.
2The US reference rate is around 0.95.
2Hindu households, but does not exist for Muslims. Third, while maternal education and urban
residence weaken the intensication eect, paternal education, a higher standard of living, and
land ownership are found to strengthen it.
Our results suggest that the nancial burden of daughters may not be the primary reason why
parents discriminate against girls. There is ample evidence that inadequate economic returns to
investments in daughters' education and health, as a result of lower female work participation
rates, as well as excessive dowry payments lower the economic value of daughters relative to sons
in India. However, a relaxation of economic constraints, which are brought about by wealth and
to some extent parental education, should raise the relative value of daughters compared to sons.
Moreover, parents who choose to have small families will have fewer nancial constraints in raising
their children compared to those who have large families. Therefore, if sex-selection is driven
primarily by economic constraints and a higher cost of raising daughters relative to sons, then
parents with smaller families and especially those with education and greater wealth should face
less incentives to discriminate against daughters. In this case, small families with educated parents
and a higher standard of living should have more balanced ospring sex-ratios. Our results reveal
that small families not only have lower female-male ospring sex-ratios { the intensication eect
{ but also that paternal education, a higher standard of living, and land ownership worsen anti-
female bias in survival within small families. The preference for sons therefore appears to overpower
the relaxation of economic constraints that may make daughters more attractive to parents.
The consequences of deteriorating sex-ratios in a country already experiencing a scarcity of
women may be dire. Not only will more unwanted daughters be terminated, either before or after
birth, but this may also result in social problems as more and more men remain unmarried. For
example, Hudson & den Boer (2004) explain that a shortage of women for marriage may result in
the majority of low-status men remaining unmarried or paying a bride price in order to obtain a
wife. In India, the shortage of eligible women does not seem to have led to a general rise in their
value and bargaining power both before and after marriage. A simple equilibrium argument would
3predict that the lack of women for marriage in the areas with the lowest sex-ratios would have
been followed by a fall in dowries which, in turn, would induce parents to raise more girls. This
does not seem to have happened. On the contrary, the severe lack of women in certain regions of
India seems to have resulted in increased trade in \brides" between states, forced prostitution, and
sexual abuse of women and children.3
Important policy conclusions can be drawn from our results. It is essential that India's much
needed family planning programs are accompanied by policies that seek to create more balanced
sex-ratios. More widespread education and increased wealth { both changes that India's rapidly
growing economy will generate { may not improve ospring sex-ratios in a country dominated by son
preference and daughter aversion. On the contrary, our results suggest that increases in education
and wealth may deteriorate India's already skewed ospring sex-ratios, especially as fertility begins
to decline. Education and wealth may directly lower ospring sex-ratios by increasing households'
access to pre-natal sex-selection technology. However, these factors may also lower ospring sex-
ratios indirectly by inducing fertility decline.
Thus, policies that seek to eradicate son preference by making daughters more economically
attractive to parents are critically needed. These may include education, health, and food subsidies
to families with only daughters, free college education and reservation of well-paid public sector
jobs for women, as well as strict enforcement of the minimum age at marriage for women and anti-
dowry legislation. Policies that target wealthier parents are even more necessary since greater wealth
not only induces fertility decline but also increases access to pre-natal sex-selection technologies.
Inculcating more gender-equal attitudes within individuals, either through education or the media,
may play a role in diminishing son preference and daughter aversion. While family planning and
lower fertility are critical for India's economic development, individuals' fundamental preference for
sons must be acknowledged and addressed in order to avoid any unwanted consequences of fertility
decline.
In the literature on imbalanced sex-ratios, few papers allow for fertility outcomes to in
uence
3BBC World News, 5 April 2006.
4anti-female bias in birth and survival, even though fertility choices can play a signicant role in
altering ospring sex-ratios. As discussed in Das Gupta & Bhat (1997), fertility decline can have
two potential eects on ospring sex-ratios { a `parity' or an `intensication' eect. Based on the
observation that excess mortality of daughters in South Asia is concentrated among higher parities
(Das Gupta 1987, Muhuri & Preston 1991, Pebley & Amin 1991), the parity eect predicts that
fertility decline will improve ospring sex-ratios in favor of daughters. However, studies in China
and South Korea (Hull 1990, Yi et al. 1993) show that anti-female bias in survival has intensied
at each parity as fertility has declined. If the number of children desired by parents falls more
rapidly than the number of sons they desire, female-male ospring sex-ratios will decline as fertility
declines. Das Gupta & Bhat (1997) nd that the intensication eect dominated the parity eect
during the 1980s in India. Ding & Hesketh (2006) nd that the one child policy in China introduced
a sharp decline in the total birth rate and preferred family size while at the same time, the female-
male birth ratio deteriorated considerably. More recently, Ebenstein (2007) simulates a model and
nds that a subsidy paid to Chinese families without a son will not only lower fertility but will also
create more balanced sex-ratios.
Our paper builds on the existing literature by examining the relationship between fertility
choices and ospring sex-ratios using a multinomial model of fertility and sex-selection. We exam-
ine both between- and within-family-size dierences in ospring sex-ratios and focus on household
characteristics, such as parental education, standard of living, land ownership, and sector of resi-
dence, that may in
uence both fertility and sex-selection. We incorporate several methodological
innovations in this paper. First, in contrast to the vast majority of the previous work that has
relied for various reasons on aggregated data, our analysis employs household level data to examine
household decisions about ospring sex-selection. Second, we include ospring sex-selection in a
more general setting of fertility outcomes. Rather than examine the relative preference for boys
and girls, women's choice sets are expanded to include the option not to have any (more) children.
Embedding sex-selection into a broader fertility framework provides more precise empirical evi-
5dence for parental motivation. Third, in examining the relationship between fertility choices and
ospring sex-ratios, we control for persistent mother-specic traits that may aect gender-specic
mortality outcomes. Fourth, we allow for dierences in the relationship between fertility choices
and ospring sex-ratios by religion, caste, parental education, standard of living, land ownership,
and sector of residence { all factors that may in
uence both fertility and sex-selection.
Even though we control for mother-specic unobservables which may aect both fertility choices
as well as ospring sex-ratios, the possibility of reverse causation between the number of children
parents have and the gender composition of those children still exists.4 Although our coecient
estimates cannot be interpreted as causal due to the possibility of reverse causation, our analysis
does provide evidence of a robust positive correlation between family size and female-male ospring
sex-ratios. Moreover, this correlation exists even though we control for persistent genetic and
environmental factors that may result in correlations in mortality outcomes among daughters or
sons of the same mother.
Using fertility histories of women in the Second National Family Health Survey (1998-99),
Figure 4 shows ospring sex-ratios that vary considerably with the number of children a woman
has. Using the full sample of women in our data, i.e. women with both complete and potentially
incomplete families, one-child families have on average 848 daughters for every 1000 sons.5 There
is a considerable fall in this gure to 755 daughters per 1000 sons in two-child families and 818
daughters per 1000 sons in three-child families. The ospring sex-ratio increases as the number
of children increase beyond three and is over 1000 for families with ve or more children. The
dierence in ospring sex-ratios by family size is even more dramatic for women with complete
families with one-, two-, and three-child families having an average of 638, 612, and 738 daughters
per 1000 sons with the bias reversing for families with ve or more children. This gure suggests
4For example, if parents are willing and able to use pre- or post-natal sex-selection to achieve their desired gender
composition of children, it is likely that fertility choice may determine ospring sex-ratios. On the other hand, for
parents who are not willing or able to use sex-selection and are less concerned about having small families, their
ospring sex-ratio may well determine how many children they ultimately have. These parents may stop having
children only after they achieve their desired gender composition.
5Complete families are dened as those where the mother has undergone a permanent method of contraception,
i.e. sterilization, or who claim to desire no more children.
6that a massive fertility decline in India could have dire consequences for the birth and survival of
daughters.
Figures 5 and 6 show dierences in ospring sex-ratios and fertility by cohort for two groups
of women. The rst group consists of women who we dene as having complete families { i.e.
sterilized women as well as those who do not desire any more children. Since one can argue that
women who simply desire no more children may still have more children in the future, we also show
ospring sex-ratios and fertility by cohort for only sterilized women, i.e. women who have denitely
completed their fertility. Both groups show decreasing ospring sex-ratios and fertility by cohort.
Thus, younger women are not only choosing to have fewer children, they are also discriminating
against daughters to a greater extent than older women. Together, Figures 1, 2, 5, and 6 are
indicative of an intensication eect and also suggest that a massive fertility decline in India may
have dire consequences for the birth and survival of daughters.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the empirical model and the assumptions
behind the estimation procedure, describes the data, and nally discusses two important empirical
issues. The results are presented in Section 3 and policy implications discussed in Section 4.
2 The estimation procedure, data, and empirical issues
2.1 The model and estimation
Although it cannot be ruled out that parents have at least some in
uence over their children's
fertility decisions, especially in the context of the Indian joint family system, we treat women as
the basic decision making unit in our analysis. Since we do not have information on unmarried
women, we assume that only women who are currently or have at some point been married are
able to have children. Given the moral sentiment pervasive throughout Indian society, this is
probably not a gross misrepresentation of reality. Parents then have the choice between not having
any children, or, conditional on having a child, engaging in sex-selection or not. The process in
which this choice is made is likely to be complex and highly non-linear and we take a reduced-form
7approach by specifying the probabilities directly without deriving them from a utility-maximization
framework.
In order to specify the empirical model, we assume that in every year after she has been married,
i 2 f1;:::;Ihg, a woman in our sample, h 2 f1;:::;Hg, can either give birth to a boy, fbg, a girl,
fgg, or not have any children at all, an outcome denoted by fng. To account for the natural limit
on fertility, the cut-o point Ih is determined as the maximum of years she has been married at
either the time of the survey or when she reached age 45. Letting c 2 C = fb;g;ng stand for a
particular fertility outcome, the number of boys, yb
h, and girls y
g
h, a woman h has given birth to, as
well as the number of years in which she has not had any children yn
h then follows a multinomial
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The probability vectors ph are assumed to be constant and determined by a vector of covariates,
xh, and unobservable woman level random eects, ch. This random eect specication models
idiosyncratic dierences in preferences or biological factors which cannot be accounted for by the
covariates and which are not directly observable. We can then write the probability that a given




c2C exp(xhc + ch)
(1)
As in Guimar~ aes & Lindrooth (2007) we assume that the random elements exp(ch) follow
independent gamma distributions  ('ch;'ch
 1) where, for convenience of notation, 'ch = exp(xhc)
denotes the deterministic part of the probabilities. While this imposes a fairly rigid structure on the
random eects exp(ch), in particular making their variances var(exp(ch)) = 'ch
 1 a function of the
covariates, it has the desirable property that the products 'ch exp(ch) follow a gamma distribution
with shape and scale parameters 'ch and 1, respectively. As a consequence, the probability vectors
ph are stochastic and, as shown by Mosiman (1962), have independent multivariate -distributions
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The unconditional probability that a woman has given birth to yb
h boys and y
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h girls in the Ih





















where pnh = 1   pbh   pgh and yn




Making use of a result by Mosiman (1962), a closed form solution for equation 3 with probability
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where  () again represents the gamma function.
























where 'ch = exp(xhc) as dened above.
Guimar~ aes (2005) points out that the maximum likelihood function in equation 4 is equivalent
to that of a xed eects negative binomial count data model and that the estimation of the pa-
rameter vector ^ c is easily implemented. We therefore estimate a negative binomial count data
model with mother-specic xed eects to obtain the vector of coecients ^ c. The coecients
are, however, not the object of interest in themselves. Rather, we would like to be able to nd
the probability that a woman with particular characteristics gives birth to a girl or a boy. Due
to the stochastic specication of the probabilities (equation 1), the closest we can get to this is
the expected probability vector E(ph), that is the vector of probabilities for a typical woman with










Since the model allows for women not to have any children in a given year, the probability of
observing the birth of a girl does not give enough information to make statements about sex-ratios
or anti-female bias. It is, however, easy to calculate the estimated sex-ratios (SR) directly as a
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(6)
Moreover, the functional form of the expected probabilities makes it easy to compare the sex-
ratios of two typical women h and j with dierent characteristics vectors xh and xj, respectively.










^ b(xj   xh)
i
(7)
The relative sex-ratio represents an appropriate measure of dierences in the anti-female bias
of women with dierent characteristics. Comparing the probability that two women give birth to a
girl alone, in contrast, is not sucient due to the possibility that women do not have any children
in a given year. A low probability of having a daughter could thus be due to anti-female bias (if
the probability of having a son is high) or to a small family size (if a woman is likely not to have a
child in a given year).
2.2 Data
The fertility histories as well as individual characteristics used in the empirical analysis were ob-
tained from the Second National Family Health Survey (NFHS-2) conducted during 1998-99 in
26 states in India.6 The NFHS-2 is a nationally representative survey that includes a household
sample with information about each household and an individual sample covering all ever-married
6The survey was carried out by the International Institute for Population Sciences, Mumbai, India, and ORC
Macro, Calverton, Maryland.
1015-49 year old women within those households. Besides reporting various socio-economic indica-
tors, such as religion, caste, education, standard of living index, land ownership, and occupation of
ever-married women and their partners, the entire birth history of each woman is provided. The
entire sample consists of 90,303 women. Excluding women who have been married less than one
year and have therefore not had any fertility outcome in our denition we are left with 90,287
observations.
The vector of covariates, xh, consists of several household characteristics which are expected
to in
uence ospring sex-ratios as well as fertility choices. A description of the household charac-
teristics included in the analysis can be found in Table 1. Indicators for religion, caste, parental
education, standard of living, land ownership, and sector of residence are included. While the
NFHS-2 does not include measures of income, it does have information on assets owned by a
household, from which a standard of living index is calculated.7
In order to examine between- and within-family size dierences, we include an indicator for
families that have 1 or 2 children and interact this indicator with all the other covariates included
in xh. The reference household therefore consists of Hindu families with 3 or more children, who
do not belong to a scheduled caste, scheduled tribe, or other backward caste. Both parents in the
household are uneducated and the household has a low standard of living. The household does not
own any land and lives in the rural sector.
2.3 Empirical issues
Two empirical issues are worth discussing in the context of our model. The rst is the inclusion of
persistent mother-specic traits and the second relates to the sample of families that we choose to
use for our analysis.
In estimating the relationship between fertility choices and ospring sex-ratios, we control for
7The standard of living index (SLI) is calculated from 11 indicators { i.e. house type, toilet facilities, source of
lighting, main fuel for cooking, source of drinking water, separate room for cooking, ownership of house, ownership
of agricultural land, ownership of irrigated land, ownership of livestock, and ownership of durable goods. An index
score ranging from 0-14, 15-24, and 25-67 constitute a low, medium, and high standard of living, respectively.
11persistent mother-specic traits, the absence of which may result in biased coecients. Controlling
for unobservable persistent mother-specic traits that may in
uence ospring sex-ratios allows for
the fact that daughters or sons of the same mother may have correlated mortality risk because of
shared genetic or environmental factors. For example, mothers infected with the Hepatitis-B virus
(HBV) may be more likely to have sons than daughters (Drew et al. 1986, Oster 2005), resulting
in skewed sex-ratios of women with this trait. Similarly, environmental factors { such as access to
health clinics, medical facilities, clean water, and sanitation { may have gender-specic eects on
mortality risk of children since parents may be more likely to discriminate against daughters if ac-
cess to medical facilities is scarce (Oster 2007). That we nd evidence of a systematic relationship
between family size and ospring sex-ratios, even after controlling for persistent mother-specic
unobservable characteristics suggests that the intensication eect exists despite genetic or envi-
ronmental factors that may introduce gender-specic correlations in mortality risk.
In estimating the relationship between fertility outcomes and ospring sex-ratios, it may be
more appropriate to focus solely on complete families and still better to restrict the sample to
only those families where the mother has undergone sterilization. Even though the relationship
between fertility and ospring sex-ratios may be biased in incomplete families, we use the full
sample of fertility histories in order to conduct the present analysis. Our main reason for including
both complete and potentially incomplete families in our analysis is to preserve a larger sample
size which enables us to control for persistent mother-specic traits in our estimation, which is
necessary in order to obtain meaningful results.
The second reason for using the full sample rather than only complete families is that at any
given point in time, the population consists of both complete and incomplete families. Thus,
the overall ospring sex-ratio of the population is always a combination of the ospring sex-ratio
of complete and incomplete families. In this empirical analysis, we are ultimately interested in
calculating relative sex-ratios as well as predicting future changes in ospring sex-ratios with fertility
decline or economic growth among the overall population. Thus, the full sample is of relevance to
12this analysis rather than only complete families.
The third reason why we choose the full sample over complete families relates to the direction
of bias of our coecient estimates. It is important to understand how the inclusion of incomplete
families in our sample may bias the estimated relationship between fertility outcomes and ospring
sex-ratios since future children may substantially change the sex-ratio of a woman's ospring. For
example, our nding that small families have worse ospring sex-ratios than large families { i.e. the
intensication eect { may not hold if we restrict the sample to include only complete families. This
is because women with incomplete families and especially those with only one child will most likely
have more children in the future8. If daughters are more likely to survive at higher parities, then
the ospring sex-ratios of these women may improve as they move from having one child to two
children. In this case, we may nd that small complete families have higher female-male ospring
sex-ratios than small families in the full sample (i.e. both complete and incomplete families).
This suggests that an analysis that uses the full sample may either wrongly nd an intensication
eect or overestimate the intensication eect compared to an analysis that uses only complete
families. Even though restricting our analysis to complete families may provide a more realistic
relationship between family size and ospring sex-ratios, we argue that using the full sample of
women most likely underestimates the intensication eect. As shown in Figure 4, women with
complete families have worse female-male ospring sex-ratios than the full sample at every parity
until the sixth child. Moreover, the largest dierence occurs for women with one or two children.
This observation suggests that complete families may have a stronger intensication eect than the
full sample, in which case our estimated relationship between family size and ospring sex-ratios
using the full sample may be biased downwards, and our results most likely provide a lower limit
for the intensication eect.
Given the need for a larger sample to include persistent mother-specic unobservable character-
istics, that we are interested in predicting future ospring sex-ratios in the overall population, and
the likelihood that using the full sample underestimates the relationship between fertility choices
8The average number of children per woman in our sample is 2.6.
13and ospring sex-ratios, we use the full sample of women, which includes both complete and poten-
tially incomplete families, rather than restrict the sample to only those women who have completed
their fertility histories.
3 Results
Using the coecient estimates of the model, we rst calculate ospring sex-ratios among our two
main groups { large families or households with 3 or more children and small families or households
with 1 or 2 children. Among households with the reference group characteristics { i.e. Hindu, non-
low-caste, uneducated parents, low standard of living, landless, and rural { we nd that families
with 3 or more children have 963 daughters per 1000 sons whereas families with 1 or 2 children
have 823 daughters per 1000 sons. While ospring sex-ratios in both groups reveal anti-female bias
in birth and survival, smaller families have worse ospring sex-ratios.
3.1 Within-Family-Size Dierences in Ospring Sex-Ratios
We examine within-family-size dierences by calculating relative ospring sex-ratios within large
and small households separately, which we present in Tables 2 and 3. For each household size,
we calculate ospring sex-ratios of the reference household relative to households with a given
characteristic (and all other characteristics of the reference household).9
Table 2 provides relative sex-ratios for four social groups relative to our reference group { i.e.
non-low-caste Hindus { in large and small families. Ospring sex-ratios in large families are about
4% lower in Muslim than in non-low-caste Hindu households. However, in small families, Muslims
have ospring sex-ratios that are 19% higher than non-low-caste Hindus. This suggests that with
respect to fertility decline, ospring sex-ratios among Muslims may not exhibit anti-female bias as
9For example, the ospring sex-ratio of large Muslim relative to large non-low-caste Hindu families with
the reference group characteristics (presented in Table 2 (row 1, column 1)) is given by exp(^ [muslim 
female])=exp(^ [muslim  male]), where ^ [c] represents the coecient estimate of characteristic c. Similarly,
exp(^ [small  educatedmother  female])=exp(^ [small  educatedmother  male]) gives the ospring sex-ratio of
small families with educated mothers (and all other reference group characteristics) relative to small families with
uneducated mothers (and all other the reference group characteristics) for non-low-caste Hindus (row 1, column 2
of Table 3).
14more parents choose to have one or two children rather than three or more children. Among large
families, Christians and Sikhs have similar ospring sex-ratios to non-low-caste Hindus. However,
in small families, Christians and Sikhs have ospring sex-ratios that are 10% higher and 18%
lower than non-low-caste Hindus, respectively. Low-caste Hindus { that is those who belong to a
scheduled caste, a scheduled tribe, or other backward caste { have opsring sex-ratios that are 3%
lower than non-low-caste Hindus in large families. On the other hand, low-caste Hindus have 7%
higher ospring sex-ratios than non-low-caste Hindus in small families.
These results reveal that among families with one or two children, Sikhs have the worst ospring
sex-ratios, followed by non-low-caste Hindus and low-caste Hindus. Small Muslim families have
ospring sex-ratios that are most favorable to daughters, followed by small Christian families. Even
though skewed sex-ratios among the Sikh community in the northwest Indian states of Punjab and
Haryana is well established in the literature (Das Gupta 1987), this community comprises only a
small proportion of the Indian population { both large and small Sikh families represent 2.3% of
our sample whereas small Sikh families are 1.1% of the full sample. What is more worrying is
that small non-low-caste and low-caste Hindu families have among the lowest ospring sex-ratios
in India. These groups constitute the majority of the population. Both large and small Hindu
families who do not belong to a low-caste constitute 30% of our sample whereas those who belong
to a low-caste represent 48% of the sample. Even though small Hindu non-low-caste and low-caste
families constitute only 14% and 18% of our sample, these numbers are expected to increase as
more families choose to have one or two children. Thus, fertility decline in India will likely worsen
the already skewed ospring sex-ratios in the country.
Table 3 presents relative sex-ratios for large and small families within these ve social groups
by parental education, standard of living, land ownership, and sector of residence.
Among non-low-caste Hindus (columns (1) and (2)), parental education increases daughters'
survival chances relative to sons in large families. In these families, ospring sex-ratios are ap-
proximately 5% and 4% higher if the mother and father are educated, respectively. However, in
15small families, neither an educated mother nor father improves the survival chances of daughters
compared to families with uneducated parents. Compared to families with a low standard of living,
those with a medium or high standard of living have ospring sex-ratios that are 2% and 8% lower
in large and small families, respectively. While land ownership does not change the relative sur-
vival chances of daughters in large families, landed households with small families have 5% lower
ospring sex-ratios compared to landless households. Finally, within this social group there do not
appear to be signicant dierences in ospring sex-ratios by sector of residence.
Among low-caste Hindus (columns (3) and (4)), maternal education and urban residence improve
daughters' relative survival chances in small families whereas a higher standard of living deteriorates
ospring sex-ratios in large families.
Among Muslims (columns (5) and (6)), a higher standard of living, land ownership, and urban
residence hurt daughters' survival chances relative to sons in large families. However, in small
families, parental education, a higher standard of living, land ownership, and urban residence, all
increase ospring sex-ratios substantially compared to families with uneducated parents, a low
standard of living, no land, and those who reside in the rural sector, respectively. Among small
families, maternal education and urban residence improve daughters relative survival chances the
most. That education and wealth decrease female disadvantage in survival among small Muslim
families is consistent with the hypothesis that gender dierences in survival are constraint- rather
than preference-driven. One should expect to see ospring sex-ratios rise as not only family size
decreases but also as parental education and wealth relax nancial constraints in raising daughters.
Thus, for Muslims in India, anti-female disadvantage in survival appears to be driven mostly by
nancial constraints.
For Christians (columns (7) and (8)), maternal education increases daughters' survival chances
relative to sons in both large and small families, though paternal education does so only in large
families. A higher standard of living and land ownership do not change ospring sex-ratios in
large or small families while urban daughters have higher relative survival chances than their rural
16counterparts in small families. Like small Muslim families, in small Christian families maternal
education and urban residence have the largest impact on the survival of daughters.
In Sikh households (columns (9) and (10)), the survival of daughters in large families is not
in
uenced by parental education, a higher standard of living, land ownership, or sector of residence.
In small families, all these factors worsen the survival chances of daughters relative to sons. Small
families with maternal education and those who live in urban areas have ospring sex-ratios that
are 17% and 16% lower than those without maternal education and those who live in rural areas,
respectively. Small Sikh families with paternal education, land, and a higher standard of living have
ospring sex-ratios that are 21%, 23%, and 25% lower than their those without paternal education,
those who are landless, and those with a low standard of living, respectively.
Within-family-size dierences in ospring sex-ratios show that parental education, a higher
standard of living, land ownership, and urban residence increase the survival chances of daughters
relative to sons for some groups and decrease these chances for other groups. While education,
wealth, and urban residence are generally expected to diminish son preference by generating more
gender-equal and modern ideas and beliefs and by relaxing the nancial constraints associated
with raising daughters, our results show that these factors may not always work in this way. For
some groups, parental education and wealth improve daughters' relative survival chances { for
example, maternal education for low-caste Hindus with small families or a higher standard of living
for Muslims with small families. In other groups, these factors have no in
uence on daughters'
survival chances relative to sons, such as parental education in non-low-caste small Hindu families.
What is dangerous to the future survival of girls, however, is that parental education and especially
wealth increase female disadvantage in survival in several groups { for example, both maternal
and paternal education in small Sikh families and a higher standard of living in small and large
non-low-caste Hindu families, large Muslim families, small Sikh families, and large low-caste Hindu
families. For these households, which constitute a large proportion of India's population, parental
education and wealth appear to either intensify son preference or make it easier for parents to
17engage in (pre-natal) sex-selection, or both.
3.2 Between-Family-Size Dierences in Ospring Sex-Ratios
In order to examine between-family-size dierences, we calculate ospring sex-ratios of large relative
to small families.10 Table 4 presents these relative sex-ratios and their respective chi-square test
statistics and signicance levels in parentheses.11
The rst row of Table 4 presents the sex-ratio of large relative to small families for households
in the reference group { i.e. those with uneducated parents, a low standard of living, no land, and
rural residence { for non-low-caste Hindus (column 1), low-caste Hindus (column (2)), Muslims
(column 3), Christians (column 4), and Sikhs (column 5). Row 1 of Table 4 shows that families
with 1 or 2 children have dramatically lower ospring sex-ratios compared to those with 3 or more
children for all groups except Muslims. This result provides evidence of an intensication eect {
i.e. rather than discriminate more against daughters at higher parities, anti-female bias in birth
and survival exists at even lower parities when families choose to have fewer children.
For households with the reference group characteristics, the intensication eect is greatest for
Sikhs, where large families have ospring sex-ratios that are 49% higher than in small families.
Non-low-caste Hindu households also have a large intensication eect, with large families having
22% higher ospring sex-ratios than small ones. Low-caste Hindus and Christians have smaller
intensication eects, with 13% and 11% higher ospring sex-ratios in large compared to small
families, respectively. Thus, daughters face a survival disadvantage in small relative to large families
in four of our ve social groups.
10For example, the ospring sex-ratio of small relative to large Hindu families who do not belong to a low-
caste and all other reference group characteristics is calculated as exp(^ [small  female])=exp(^ [small  male]),
where ^ [c] represents the coecient estimate of characteristic c. The reciprocal of this gives the ospring sex-
ratio of large relative to small Hindu families, presented in Table 4 (row 1, column 1). Similarly, the reciprocal of
exp(^ [smallSikhfemale]+ ^ [smallurbanfemale]+ ^ [smallfemale])=exp(^ [smallSikhmale]+ ^ [small
urban  male] + ^ [small  male]) provides the ospring sex-ratio of large relative to small Sikh families who live in
urban areas but have all other reference group characteristics (row 6, column 5 of Table 4).
11For each relative sex-ratio, we conduct a chi-square test to test whether the relative sex-ratio is equal to 1 under
the null hypothesis and not equal to 1 under the alternate hypothesis. Critical chi-square values with 1 degree of
freedom are 6.63, 3.84, and 2.71 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of signicance, respectively.
18Rows 2-6 of Table 4 present ospring sex-ratios of large relative to small families within these
5 groups for households with various socio-economic characteristics. For example, the gure in
row 2 and column 1 presents the ospring sex-ratio of large relative to small families in non-low-
caste Hindu households with all the reference group characteristics except that the mother in the
household is educated.
Compared to the reference household (row 1), two characteristics lower the ospring sex-ratio of
large relative to small families { i.e. maternal education and urban residence { but only for Hindus
(both non-low-caste and low-caste) and Sikhs. Educated mothers have ospring sex-ratios that are
approximately 46%, 19%, and 11% higher in large than in small families for Sikhs, non-low-caste
Hindus, and low-caste Hindus, respectively. Intensication eects are similar for urban households,
that have ospring sex-ratios which are 45%, 19%, and 11% higher in large than in small families for
Sikhs, non-low-caste Hindus, and low-caste Hindus, respectively. Thus, daughters with educated
mothers and those in urban areas continue to face a survival disadvantage in small relative to
large families. However, this relative disadvantage is slightly lower than that faced by daughters
with uneducated mothers and those in rural areas. Factors that strengthen the intensication
eect compared to the reference household are paternal education, a medium or high standard
of living, and land ownership. Educated fathers have ospring sex-ratios that are approximately
55%, 26%, 18%, and 15% higher in large than in small families for Sikhs, non-low-caste Hindus,
low-caste Hindus, and Christians respectively. Intensication eects are stronger for households
with a medium or high standard of living { ospring sex-ratios are 62%, 32%, 23%, and 11% higher
in large than in small families for Sikhs, non-low-caste Hindus, low-caste Hindus, and Christians
respectively. Land ownership also strengthens the intensication eect for these groups. Sikhs,
non-low-caste Hindus, low-caste Hindus, and Christians have respectively 58%, 29%, 20%, and
17% higher ospring sex-ratios in large than in small families if they own land. These results
indicate that the survival disadvantage faced by daughters in small relative to large families is
higher for those with educated fathers and greater wealth.
19Even though Muslim households with the reference group characteristics do not exhibit an
intensication eect, Muslims with a medium or high standard of living and those who own land
have ospring sex-ratios that are 11% and 8% higher in large than in small families, respectively.
These results support the within-family-size analysis for Muslims and again suggest that for this
social group anti-female disadvantage in survival is driven mostly by nancial constraints.
These results show that daughters' survival chances relative to sons are much lower in families
with only 1 or 2 children compared to those with 3 or more children, providing evidence of an
intensication eect. While maternal education and urban residence slightly improve the relative
survival disadvantage that daughters face in small compared to large families, factors that capture
a household's wealth { namely, paternal education, a higher standard of living, and land ownership
{ intensify the anti-female disadvantage in survival in small relative to large families.
4 Conclusion
Our within-family-size results reveal that regardless of fertility decline, economic growth in India
may worsen ospring sex-ratios mostly as a result of the increase in wealth that it is likely to
generate. Between-family-size results indicate that fertility decline may severely deteriorate o-
spring sex-ratios due to an intensication eect that exists for the majority of households in India.
While maternal education and urban residence slightly weaken the intensication eect, paternal
education, a higher standard of living, and land ownership all strengthen it.
In order to predict how future changes in family size, parental education, wealth, and urban-
ization may change female-male ospring sex-ratios in India, we calculate changes in the decit of
daughters as the proportion of households with a small family, maternal and paternal education, a
medium or higher standard of living, and urban residence increase.12
In Table 5, Panel A, we rst provide the overall predicted ospring sex-ratio in our sample
(row 1 of Panel A). We calculate the overall ospring sex-ratio of the population as a weighted
12These predictions are for illustrative purposes only since the use of point estimates of parameters to predict
large changes in exogenous variables is unlikely to lead to exact results. Nevertheless, these numbers illustrate the
magnitude of the issue and show nicely potential future trends.
20average of the ospring sex-ratio of households with dierent characteristics.13 We nd that the
overall predicted ospring sex-ratio is approximately 885 daughters per 1000 sons in India, which
is very close to the estimate from the 2001 Census of India of 891 daughters per 1000 sons for ever-
married women of all ages. Using the total number of surviving sons in the 2001 Census (roughly
385 million), we calculate the number of missing daughters compared to the case of equality { i.e.
1000 daughters surviving per 1000 sons. We nd that the daughter decit is approximately 44
million. We then allow the proportion of households with small families to increase by 5% and
the proportion of large families to decrease by 5% (row 2 of Panel A) and nd that this change
will result in an additional decit of 3.7 million daughters. Similarly, a 10%, 15%, 20%, and 25%
increase in the proportion of small families will result in an additional decit of 7.4, 11.2, 14.9, and
18.6 million daughters, respectively.
We conduct a similar exercise for increases in the proportion of households with maternal
education in Panel B of Table 5. Even though our within- and between-family size dierences
indicate that maternal education increases daughters' survival chances relative to sons, we nd that
a 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, and 25% increase in the proportion of households with educated mothers
will increase the current decit of daughters by 0.02, 0.04, 0.07, 0.09, and 0.1 million, respectively.
Since female education is a signicant factor in inducing fertility decline, a disproportionately
high number of small (large) family households also have educated (uneducated) mothers. Among
all households in our sample, 28% have small families and educated mothers and 17% have small
families and uneducated mothers. On the other hand, 21% have large families and educated mothers
whereas 33% have large families and uneducated mothers. Therefore, an exercise that increases
the proportion of households with educated mothers also increases the proportion of small family
households. That the overall eect of an increase in maternal education is to worsen daughters'
13each of the ve broad social groups { i.e. non-low-caste Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh, and low-caste Hindu
families { are divided into large and small families, resulting in 10 groups. In addition, there are 32 combinations
of the ve household characteristics that we control for in our estimation { namely, maternal education, paternal
education, a medium or high standard of living, land ownership, and urban residence. Thus, we have a total of 320
groups of households, for which we estimate ospring sex-ratios using the coecients of our empirical analysis. We
also calculate the proportion of each of these 320 groups in the overall population and use these as weights to nd
the overall predicted ospring sex-ratio in the population.
21survival chances relative to sons indicates that the indirect adverse eect of female education on
ospring sex-ratios (via fertility decline) dominates any direct survival advantage that daughters
face relative to sons with educated mothers.
In Panels C, D, and E of Table 5 we conduct a similar analysis for paternal education, a medium
or high standard of living, and urban residence, respectively. The decit of daughters decreases
in two cases { as the proportion of households with paternal education increases as well as the
proportion of urban households increases. However, as the proportion of households with a medium
or high standard of living increases while the proportion of households with a low standard of living
falls, the decit of girls increases substantially. While these 3 factors are also drivers of fertility
decline, they are not as signicant in decreasing family size as is female education. Therefore, the
direct eect of changes in these factors on ospring sex-ratios appear to dominate their indirect
eect (via fertility decline). Thus, paternal education and urban residence increase daughters'
survival chances relative to sons, which is consistent with our within-family-size results for most
social groups. On the other hand, a medium or high standard of living decreases daughters' survival
chances relative to sons, which also supports our within-family-size results.
Even though increasing levels of paternal education and urbanization may create more balanced
ospring sex-ratios in India, maternal education, increased wealth, and especially fertility decline
may counter any improvement in anti-female survival disadvantage and even worsen the country's
already skewed sex-ratios. The deterioration in ospring sex-ratios that may occur as India's
economy develops and fertility declines suggests an urgent need for policies that attempt to lower
son preference. While economic growth and the changes it will bring about { such as higher
levels of education and wealth { are much needed to improve human development levels in India,
these changes can be detrimental to the survival of females. Moreover, even though policies that
control fertility are of utmost importance to curb India's spiraling population, fertility decline may
dramatically deteriorate ospring sex-ratios in the country. Thus, policies that target son preference
and the economic returns to raising daughters and sons are essential in order to restore more
22balanced sex-ratios in India. Such policies need to make daughters more economically attractive
to parents by providing education, health, and food subsidies to families with only daughters.
Provision of free education to girls, not only in school but also in college as well as reserving skilled
jobs for women may help raise the economic return to investing in daughters relative to sons.
Further, strict enforcement of the minimum age at marriage for women and anti-dowry legislation
may make daughters a more attractive option for parents.
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24Figure 1: Total Fertility Rate: India (1951-2005)
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26Figure 3: Female-Male Birth Ratios: Indian Districts, 2001


































































































29Figure 6: Cohort Dierences in Fertility in India
Source: NFHS-2 (1998-1999).
30Table 1: Description of Dependent & Explanatory Variables
Variable Description
Dependent Variable Categories
yb number of surviving sons
yg number of surviving daughters
yn number of years in marriage without a birth of a son or daughter
Household Characteristics
Muslim 1 if household is Muslim, 0 otherwise
Christian 1 if household is Christian, 0 otherwise
Sikh 1 if household is Sikh, 0 otherwise
Low-Caste 1 if household belongs to scheduled caste, scheduled tribe, or other
backward caste, 0 otherwise
Mother Educated 1 if mother has primary, middle, or higher education, 0 otherwise
Father Educated 1 if father has primary, middle, or higher education, 0 otherwise
Medium or High SLI 1 if household has medium or high standard of living index (SLI), 0 otherwise
Land Ownership 1 if household owns land, 0 otherwise
Urban 1 if household resides in urban sector, 0 otherwise
Small Family 1 if there are 1 or 2 children, 0 otherwise
Source: NHFS-2 (1998-99). In addition to all the households characteristics listed in Table 1, interactions of the indicator for small
families with all other household characteristics are also included.
31Table 2: Relative Ospring Sex-Ratios Within Large and Small Families: Religion and Caste
Household Large Family Small Family
Characteristic (3 or more Children) (1 or 2 Children)
(1) (2)
(1) Muslim versus non-low-caste Hindu 0.9620 1.1908
(7.83)*** (23.79)***
(2) Christian versus non-low-caste Hindu 1.0076 1.0982
(0.13) (4.50)**
(3) Sikh versus non-low-caste Hindu 0.9786 0.8154
(0.38) (12.85)***
(4) Low-caste versus non-low-caste Hindu 0.9728 1.0730
(6.88)*** (10.42)***
Source: NHFS-2 (1998-99). The reference household has the following characteristics: non-low-caste, un-
educated parents, low SLI, landless, and rural. Chi-square test statistics and signicance are reported in
parentheses. For each relative sex-ratio, we conduct a chi-square test to test whether the relative sex-ratio is
equal to 1 under the null hypothesis and not equal to 1 under the alternate hypothesis. Critical chi-square
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































33Table 4: Ospring Sex-Ratios of Large Relative to Small Families
Household Non-Low-Caste Low-Caste Muslim Christian Sikh
Characteristic Hindu Hindu
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) Reference Household 1.2156 1.1328 1.0208 1.1069 1.4908
(46.40)*** (27.06)*** (0.29) (4.19)** (51.13)***
(2) Educated Mother 1.1940 1.1128 1.0028 1.0873 1.4644
(27.21)*** (10.91)*** (0.00) (2.64) (42.88)***
(3) Educated Father 1.2617 1.1759 1.0596 1.1489 1.5474
(65.01)*** (40.06)*** (2.16) (8.03)*** (62.02)***
(4) Medium or High SLI 1.3200 1.2302 1.1086 1.2020 1.6189
(81.36)*** (52.05)*** (6.96)*** (13.81)*** (80.61)***
(5) Landed 1.2852 1.1977 1.0793 1.1703 1.5762
(82.93)*** (56.76)*** (3.98)** (10.43)*** (69.93)***
(6) Urban 1.1860 1.1053 0.9960 1.0800 1.4546
(27.40)*** (10.93)*** (0.01) (2.10) (40.72)***
Source: NHFS-2 (1998-99). The reference household has the following characteristics: non-low-caste, uneducated
parents, low SLI, landless, and rural. Chi-square test statistics and signicance are reported in parentheses. For
each relative sex-ratio, we conduct a chi-square test to test whether the relative sex-ratio is equal to 1 under the null
hypothesis and not equal to 1 under the alternate hypothesis. Critical chi-square values with 1 degree of freedom are
6.63, 3.84, and 2.71 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of signicance, respectively.
34Table 5: Predicted Ospring Sex-Ratios With Fertility Decline and Increases in Education, Stan-
dard of Living, and Urban Residence
Percentage of Percentage of Overall Daughter Actual Change in
Panel A Households with Households with Number of Decit Daughter Daughter
Large Families Small Families Daughters per 1000 sons Decit Decit
per 1000 sons
Current 54.51 45.49 884.79 115.21 44,374,257
Scenario 1 49.51 50.49 875.08 124.92 48,113,548 3,739,291
Scenario 2 44.51 55.49 865.37 134.63 51,852,838 7,478,581
Scenario 3 39.51 60.49 855.66 144.34 55,592,129 11,217,872
Scenario 4 34.51 65.49 845.95 154.05 59,331,419 14,957,162
Scenario 5 29.51 70.49 836.25 163.75 63,070,710 18,696,453
Percentage of Percentage of Overall Daughter Actual Change in
Panel B Households with Households with Number of Decit Daughter Daughter
Uneducated Mothers Educated Mothers Daughters per 1000 sons Decit Decit
per 1000 sons
Current 50.87 49.13 884.79 115.21 44,374,257
Scenario 1 45.87 54.13 884.73 115.27 44,398,464 24,207
Scenario 2 40.87 59.13 884.66 115.34 44,422,671 48,414
Scenario 3 35.87 64.13 884.60 115.40 44,446,878 72,620
Scenario 4 30.87 69.13 884.54 115.46 44,471,084 96,827
Scenario 5 25.87 74.13 884.47 115.53 44,495,291 121,034
Percentage of Percentage of Overall Daughter Actual Change in
Panel C Households with Households with Number of Decit Daughter Daughter
Uneducated Fathers Educated Fathers Daughters per 1000 sons Decit Decit
per 1000 sons
Current 26.75 73.25 884.79 115.21 44,374,257
Scenario 1 21.75 78.25 884.88 115.12 44,338,406 -35,851
Scenario 2 16.75 83.25 884.97 115.03 44,302,555 -71,702
Scenario 3 11.75 88.25 885.07 114.93 44,266,704 -107,553
Scenario 4 6.75 93.25 885.16 114.84 44,230,853 -143,404
Scenario 5 1.75 98.25 885.25 114.75 44,195,002 -179,255
Percentage of Percentage of Overall Daughter Actual Change in
Panel D Households with Households with Number of Decit Daughter Daughter
Low SLI Medium or High Daughters per 1000 sons Decit Decit
SLI per 1000 sons
Current 28.91 71.09 885 115 44,374,257
Scenario 1 23.91 76.09 883 117 45,126,091 751,833
Scenario 2 18.91 81.09 881 119 45,877,924 1,503,667
Scenario 3 13.91 86.09 879 121 46,629,757 2,255,500
Scenario 4 8.91 91.09 877 123 47,381,591 3,007,333
Scenario 5 3.91 96.09 875 125 48,133,424 3,759,167
Percentage of Percentage of Overall Daughter Actual Change in
Panel E Rural Urban Number of Decit Daughter Daughter
Households Households Daughters per 1000 sons Decit Decit
per 1000 sons
Current 68.62 31.38 884.79 115.21 44,374,257
Scenario 1 63.62 36.38 884.81 115.19 44,367,223 -7,035
Scenario 2 58.62 41.38 884.82 115.18 44,360,188 -14,069
Scenario 3 53.62 46.38 884.84 115.16 44,353,154 -21,104
Scenario 4 48.62 51.38 884.86 115.14 44,346,119 -28,138
Scenario 5 43.62 56.38 884.88 115.12 44,339,085 -35,173
Source: NHFS-2 (1998-99).
35